AI Governance
Lehigh Valley's OCR settlement shows what your risk analysis answer has to prove
HHS OCR's settlement with Lehigh Valley Health Network cites a risk analysis that did not cover all ePHI and no regular review of system activity. Those are the two questionnaire answers HealthTech vendors most often write as a yes or no, and they should be evidence.
November 13, 2026 · 6 min read

The first two findings in OCR's latest ransomware settlement are a risk analysis that did not cover all of the organization's ePHI and no procedure to regularly review system activity. On Oct. 29, HHS announced that its Office for Civil Rights settled its investigation of Lehigh Valley Health Network and its affiliated covered entities, with a three-year corrective action plan that OCR will monitor. HHS calls it OCR's 22nd ransomware enforcement action.
Those two findings matter well beyond Pennsylvania. They are the same two items that show up near the top of nearly every security questionnaire a health system sends a HealthTech vendor, and they are the two vendors most often answer with a single word.
What HHS says happened
According to HHS, LVHN discovered suspicious activity in its IT system on Feb. 4, 2023, which was later determined to be ransomware, and filed a breach report on May 15, 2023. PHI was exfiltrated and posted on the dark web. HHS says the attack affected the PHI of 248,359 individuals and included sensitive photographs of cancer patients receiving radiation oncology treatment, along with names, Social Security numbers, diagnoses, lab results, and treatment information.
OCR found that LVHN had potentially violated the Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Rules. The HHS announcement lists five potential violations:
- Failing to conduct an accurate and thorough risk analysis of the risks and vulnerabilities to all of its ePHI.
- Failing to implement procedures to regularly review records of information system activity, such as audit logs, access reports, and security incident tracking reports.
- Impermissibly disclosing the PHI of 248,359 individuals.
- Failing to timely notify affected individuals.
- Failing to timely notify the HHS Secretary.
The word "potentially" is doing real work there. These are OCR's findings in a settlement, not a court judgment. Clinical Cyber Dispatch, which reviewed the resolution agreement, reports that the signed agreement states LVHN does not admit liability. The same newsletter notes that the agreement says the incident involved an IT system of a physician group acquired in 2021, and that the corrective action plan applies to the entities listed in it.
What the corrective action plan requires
Under the plan, HHS says LVHN committed to four steps: conduct an accurate and thorough risk analysis of its ePHI, develop and implement a risk management plan to address what the analysis finds, review and revise its HIPAA policies and procedures, and review or revise its workforce training so it fits each person's job duties.
OCR Director Paula M. Stannard tied the first two findings together directly: "Failure to conduct an accurate and thorough risk analysis and to undertake regular review of information system activity makes regulated entities attractive targets for cyberattacks."
The announcement also lists steps OCR recommends for regulated entities, and it names business associates in that list explicitly. The first is to identify where ePHI is located, including how it enters, flows through, and leaves your systems. Others include audit controls, regular review of system activity, authentication, encryption in transit and at rest, and folding lessons from incidents back into the security program.
Why a yes is not an answer
A typical questionnaire asks, "Do you perform an annual HIPAA risk analysis?" and "Do you review audit logs?" Most vendors check yes. After a settlement like this one, a health system security reviewer has good reason to read the yes skeptically, because OCR's finding was not that LVHN had no risk analysis. It was that the analysis was not accurate and thorough across all of its ePHI.
That wording is the gap. A risk analysis can exist, be current, and still miss the system where the data actually lives. The acquired physician group detail in the agreement, as reported by Clinical Cyber Dispatch, is a reminder of how that happens: systems that arrive through an acquisition, a new product line, or a quick integration can sit outside the scope of an analysis written before they existed.
For a HealthTech vendor, the equivalents are familiar. A support tool that holds patient screenshots from tickets. An analytics copy of production data. A sandbox seeded with real records. A new AI feature that sends PHI to a model provider. Each one is ePHI, and each one is easy to leave out.
What your questionnaire answer should show
Here is how I would rewrite the two answers, so a reviewer sees evidence instead of a checkbox.
For risk analysis, attach or summarize:
- The ePHI inventory the analysis covered, listed by system, including support, analytics, backups, and any AI or model provider that receives PHI.
- A data flow for each, following OCR's own phrasing: how ePHI enters, moves through, and leaves.
- The date of the last analysis and what triggers an update, such as a new system, a new subprocessor, or an acquisition.
- The risk management plan that came out of it: the top risks, the owner of each, and the status.
For system activity review, show:
- Which systems produce logs that cover ePHI access, and which do not yet.
- Who reviews them, how often, and what they look for. A named role and a cadence, not "our SIEM."
- One recent example of a review that led to an action, described without sensitive detail.
- How long logs are kept, so the health system knows what you could reconstruct after an incident.
If any line in those lists is a gap today, say so with a date. A reviewer can work with a known gap. A yes that falls apart in the first follow-up call costs you more time than the honest answer would have.
The test to run this week
Pull your most recent risk analysis and list every system it names. Then list every system that touches PHI today, including the ones added since it was written. Any system on the second list and not the first is where your questionnaire answer is currently wrong. I made a related point in Giving outside IT admin rights near the EHR without a shared account: named accounts and session logs matter because they leave evidence you can show when someone asks. How many systems are on your second list that are missing from the first?